The Agile Leader

Military Financial Behavior

2010-02-09T13:08:00.002-06:00

I'm not a fan of blogging. It seems to end up as "blitching" about a gripe or needless cheerleading. It frequently masquerades as journalism which is probably why my more gullible relatives now believe quite a few blatant and incendiary conspiracy theories found floating around posing as legitimate prose. But it's a requirement, so here goes...

A child does what feels good. An adult makes a plan and executes it. I borrowed this maxim from a popular author, but I think it is a powerful metric of a very taboo topic in the military: financial behavior.

I have never received or sought financial advice from a supervisor in the military. Aside from the occasional overheard discussion, finance is an uncommon topic among military coworkers. On the one hand, this make sense. Culturally, finances are taboo. We like to create the image that we make, have and use lots of money, but we don't like to talk about the numbers or methods behind the image. The soaring foreclosure, bankruptcy and other credit default rates in America are a pretty clear indication that the math behind the image adds up to a negative number for too many people. Are some of those people in your unit?

According to one study, money-related strife causes over half of American divorces. It's commonly accepted that half of all marriages end in divorce. Rates in the military are similar, but we don't talk about it. We have regular suicide prevention and PTSD briefings. We're told to watch our battle buddy for signs that he might be depressed. Have you ever been told to watch him for signs that he might be living beyond his means?

Sex is a taboo topic in most cultures. In America, we have grown more comfortable discussing it but it is not hard to find a school district struggling with some parents who still don't want their children to receive sex education. In general however, condoms, birth control and avoiding unwanted pregnancy or disease are mainstream topics in America. In general, Americans have figured out that unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases will not go away without education and dialogue. If you knew a soldier in your unit was with a different partner every weekend, would you ask him how he/she prevents disease or pregnancy? Why not? How is this different from self-destructive financial behavior? Does it have less effect on good order and discipline?

After financially "doing dumb with zeros on the end", I have a new definition of the word 'afford'. 'Afford' means I can pay for it with cash from a planned segment of my family's budget. If I want say, a 2009 basic Chevy Tahoe, that'll be about $36K. Add chrome wheels and tires? A conservative extra $2K. Base pay for an 18 year E-6 is just shy of $45K. An O-3 with 6 years: ~$61K. An O-6 with 18 years: ~$104K. Six year payments on that Tahoe at 10%: $700/mo or $8400/yr. Why the math? Have you seen a member or your unit driving a vehicle that in payments alone costs over 25% of his pay? If he/she needs a flashy car, how nice is the house? Toys? Emergency savings? Retirement savings? College savings? Where is he going in that truck, besides trouble?

How is “affording” possible on a military salary? The same as on any other salary – by living within one’s means. As that popular author would say, “Live like no one else now… so that later you can LIVE like no on else.” Don’t be that child that pulls out the plastic to buy things just because they’re pretty or shiny or everyone else seems to have one. Be the adult that tells his/her money where to go, when to go there, how to go there and what to get done. You do this with the tactical actions of your unit? Why not your money? Healthy financial behavior is characterized by lifelong habits of making sound plan for one’s money (not credit), executing it, evaluating it and adapting it.

The bottom line is that financial behavior of many military members, especially younger members, needs attention. Too many of us act like children with our money and it’s a recipe for retiring in disaster instead of dignity. Crushing debt leads to debilitating stress and declining soldier fitness across all domains. If you would intervene in your soldiers’ lives when drug, sex, alcohol or other destructive behaviors manifest, why not help them with their finances?

Brian Oneill
MAJ, USAF
CGSCSG 19A

The Marine Corps' 234th Birthday

2009-11-12T21:35:00.002-06:00

In 1921, Commandant, MGen John A. Lejuene directed that all commands publish a reminder to Marines of the Corps' honorable service on its birthday. Consequently, his words have been immortalized in the Marine Corps Manual, edition 1921, and are republished annually as part of the Marine Corps birthday celebrations around the globe. Additionally, at a minimum--depending on capability--Marines conduct a cake cutting ceremony. This ceremony, although short, represents the traditions and honor afforded those who have served before us as well as those currently serving. The cake is presented to the eldest Marine present to signify the honor and respect for experience and seniority. The eldest Marine then presents his or her piece of cake to the youngest Marine present to symbolize the mentorship and leadership provided by experienced Marines to younger Marines. This short exchange serves as a tangible reminder of what it means to be a Marine and the responsibilities willingly incurred.

The Marine Corps' 234th birthday was celebrated by the commanding officer, Col M. McCoy, and the Marines of CGSC as well as numerous veterans at the VA hospital in Ft. Leavenworth. Those in attendance were retirees from a variety of the services, there to honor the Marine Corps' birthday and observe the customary cake cutting ceremony. These retirees, many with physical injuries suffered during their service to this nation, were very enthusiastic about honoring the Corps and the Marines present. Being among Marines--past and present--is what the Marine Corps' birthday celebration is all about.

Each service has its own history and traditions that it honors. Celebrations like the Marine Corps' birthday offer a way to build camaraderie and reinforce our ties to the past. In this way, Marines and all service members can forge a future worthy of the sacrifices of those who have preceded us and the hardships they endured.

D. C. Emmel

Major, USMC

CGSC SG19A

Obama seeks study on local leaders for troop decision

2009-10-29T06:28:00.003-05:00

AFGHAN PROVINCES TO BE ANALYZED

Details should help president determine need

By Scott Wilson and Greg JaffeWashington

Post Staff Writers

Thursday, October 29, 2009

President Obama has asked senior officials for a province-by-province analysis of Afghanistan to determine which regions are being managed effectively by local leaders and which require international help, information that his advisers say will guide his decision on how many additional U.S. troops to send to the battle.
Obama made the request in a meeting Monday with Vice President Biden and a small group of senior advisers helping him decide whether to expand the war. The detail he is now seeking also reflects the administration's turn toward Afghanistan's provincial governors, tribal leaders and local militias as potentially more effective partners in the effort than a historically weak central government that is confronting questions of legitimacy after the flawed Aug. 20 presidential election.
"This is obviously a complicated security environment in Afghanistan, and the president wants the clearest possible understanding of what the challenges are to our forces and what is required to meet that challenge," said a senior administration official who has participated in the Afghanistan policy review and spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss it. "Any successful and sustainable strategy must clearly align the resources we provide with the goals we are trying to achieve."
As U.S. forces in Afghanistan endure the deadliest month of the eight-year-old conflict, Obama is weighing a request by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, for a quick jump in forces to blunt the Taliban's momentum against concerns that too many new troops could help the insurgency's recruiting efforts.
Administration officials say that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and national security adviser James L. Jones, a retired four-star general, support Obama's request for a more detailed status report on each province that could identify potential U.S. allies among Afghanistan's local leaders, some with less-than-sterling human rights records.
Gates and Jones have pushed McChrystal to justify as specifically as possible his request for 44,000 additional troops, the figure now at the center of White House deliberations. The review group once included intelligence officials, generals and ambassadors, but it has recently narrowed to a far smaller number of senior civilian advisers, including Biden, Gates, Jones, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. Administration officials said the province-by-province analysis will be ready for Obama before his scheduled Friday meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House.
"There are a lot of questions about why McChrystal has identified the areas that he has identified as needing more forces," said a senior military official familiar with the review, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the deliberations candidly. "Some see it as an attempt by the White House to do due diligence on the commander's troop request. A less charitable view is that it is a 5,000-mile screwdriver tinkering from Washington." A range of options
The weeks-long White House review has been shaped by a central tension between the broad counterinsurgency strategy endorsed by the military and a narrower counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaeda that some senior administration officials favor.
McChrystal, who took command of the 100,000 U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan in May, is promoting a plan that calls for concentrating forces around urban areas to better protect the Afghan population and pulling back from remote regions. His idea calls for speeding the training of Afghan forces, expanding civilian efforts to improve Afghan governance and starting other long-term programs to win the support of the population that the insurgency draws from.
About half the 44,000 troops McChrystal requested would be sent to take back Taliban sanctuaries in southern Afghanistan. The others would push into western Afghanistan, where the U.S. military has only a slight presence, and reinforce operations in the mountainous east. One brigade would train Afghan army and police forces.
Even after weeks of review, administration officials say a range of options is still under consideration, including whether additional U.S. forces could be deployed in phases. Although Obama had been expected to announce his decision before leaving Nov. 11 on a 10-day trip to Asia, administration officials say he may wait until he returns.
"I think it's important to hear and to get this right," White House press secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters Wednesday.
In reviewing McChrystal's bracing assessment of the war, the president and his senior advisers have concluded that the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a military and political force, regardless of how many more troops are deployed.
The acknowledgment is behind Obama's request for an analysis of which of Afghanistan's 34 provinces can be left to local leaders, perhaps including elements of the Taliban unaligned with al-Qaeda. Administration officials have said that under any strategy, the Taliban would not be allowed to threaten the Kabul government or provide sanctuary for al-Qaeda, whose leaders operate largely from the tribal areas across the border in Pakistan.
"How much of the country can we just leave to be run by the locals?" said one U.S. official involved in Afghanistan policy, who discussed the White House request on the condition of anonymity. "How do you separate those who have taken up arms because they oppose the presence of foreigners in their area, because they're getting paid to fight us because we're there, from those who want to restore a Taliban government? How many of the people who we're fighting actually share al-Qaeda's ideology?"
Obama's interest in provincial allies also reflects the administration's growing disenchantment with President Hamid Karzai and his inability to extend his government's authority beyond Kabul during his nearly eight years in office. Provincial governments and tribal structures have long exerted more power than the central government, which many Afghans view as remote, corrupt and ineffective. Another U.S. official involved in Afghanistan policy said, "Most of Afghanistan that's stable is under local control."
"The question is: Can you get benign local control in more places?" the official said. "And will that be easier to achieve, and more effective, than trying to establish more central government control?" Refining a strategy
Critics of ceding authority to local power brokers point to Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city, where Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali Karzai has been given wide latitude to run the municipality and the surrounding province. Security in the area has deteriorated over the past year, while the cultivation of opium-producing poppies has soared.
Some U.S. and Afghan officials contend that Ahmed Wali, who heads the Kandahar provincial council, has been reluctant to crack down on drug traffickers -- and the Taliban fighters who protect them -- because he is involved in narcotics smuggling, an accusation he has repeatedly denied. The New York Times reported Wednesday that Ahmed Wali has been on the CIA's payroll for much of the past eight years.
"Ahmed Wali illustrates the challenge we face across the country," a senior U.S. official involved in Afghanistan policy said Wednesday. "Do we pay him off to help us -- whatever help that may be -- or is our goal of improving the government more important than doing these kinds of deals?"
Obama is refining his strategy from several options outlined during more than 15 hours of meetings in the White House, administration officials say.
Some White House officials, including Biden, have advocated a strategy that would focus primarily on counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda. The vice president has argued for preserving the current U.S. troop level of 68,000, expediting the training of Afghan forces, intensifying Predator drone strikes against al-Qaeda operatives and supporting the Pakistani government against the Taliban within its borders.
But the deepening conflict is complicating those plans. For example, administration officials say that sending additional U.S. training brigades to accelerate preparation of the Afghan security forces may not accomplish as much as hoped because recruitment -- and retention -- has gone poorly as the war intensifies.
"It's all part of the endemic problems of illiteracy and security that plague many countries, but particularly this one," said a senior administration official familiar with the review process, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss it. "You want to increase the number of people engaged in training, but at some point bringing in more and more Americans won't produce quicker results. There's a ceiling."
McChrystal has advocated something far closer to a nation-building project. Some Republican supporters of the general's plan in Congress have compared his strategy to the 2007 "surge" of U.S. troops in Iraq, a shorter-term effort that helped pull the country back from sectarian civil war.
But administration officials reject the comparison, pointing out that McChrystal's troop request would require a far longer deployment of U.S. forces and that Afghanistan is in a less dire position than Iraq was at the time of the surge.
Most important, administration officials say, the violence in Afghanistan is directed against U.S. forces rather than among Afghans. In Iraq, much of the pre-surge violence involved Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites fighting for control of the state, which gave the U.S. military a clearer role in protecting Iraqi civilians.
"There are some areas of the country that will fight us and fight the Taliban just because we are there," Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, told reporters Wednesday.

Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned: A Target of Opportunity Missed

2009-10-21T16:26:00.004-05:00

The Guest Speaker Program (GSP) at CGSC is intended to expand our knowledge in subjects and problem areas that we are likely to face in the next ten years or so of our careers. Ideally, it gets us to think critically about these topics. If we are lucky, the topics presented by the guest speaker might even nest with the current block of instruction in the curriculum. In this regard, I think we missed a great opportunity to nest the message of LTG(Ret) Honore’s presentation with our study in Full Spectrum Operations.

LTG(Ret) Honore spoke for about an hour, ostensibly about the coordinated efforts to respond to Hurricane Katrina. His talk was entertaining and enjoyable. Indeed, he generated more laughter from his audience than any speaker thus far. However, the take-away from his colorful presentation seemed to me to be: don’t buy waterfront property unless you plan on dealing with a natural disaster one day, stock up on MREs and water, get a weather radio, and buy some tarps. While I appreciate a good-humored talk as much as the next guy (and agree with this preparedness advice), I would have thought that given his position as the JTF Katrina Commander, LTG(Ret) Honore could have focused more on the lessons learned from the Civil Support Operations side of things. How did we respond to this disaster and how should we respond in the future?

Instead, we were provided other nuggets of insight that might only apply to a few officers in the auditorium: you can design the next smart plane, you can build the next smart home-computer to sniff and taste food, or, if you are going to be in charge of building roads and bridges, be sure to build the bridges up over the water. For those of you who see these sorts of activities in your next ten years, I hope that these additions to your kit bag will be helpful.

As for the rest of us who, I think, are likely to have to deal with planning or supporting a response to a natural disaster, our kit bag was left woefully empty. I was hoping LTG(Ret) Honore’s talk would answer some of these questions: What critical planning factors do we need to consider when dealing with local and federal agencies? What issues with command and control were the most problematic? How did you share information and intelligence from across the different agencies to create a common operating picture? The opportunity to hear directly from a former JTF commander about lessons learned from his or her operation is somewhat rare, and we missed it.

Without finding fault, I suppose I will fall back on the “Adult Education Model” taught here at CGSC and figure out for myself what the published lessons learned are and nest those with the current block of instruction. Now I will make a concerted effort to go to CALL and retrieve copies of Disaster Response: Hurricanes Katrina & Rita, IIR No. 06-11, FEB 2006 and Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer’s Handbook, CALL Handbook No. 06-08, MAY 06. I am confident that these documents will provide me with useful information for my development as a field grade leader.

MAJ Christopher McGarry
US Army, AR

CGSC SG19A

Staff Group 19A Engages in First Ever Bloggers Roundtable

2009-10-18T15:24:00.002-05:00

On 15 October 2009, Majors from CGSC Staff Group 19A conducted the first ever bloggers round table. The theme of the teleconference was the following; “The experiences of combat veterans and the activities of the U.S. Army Command and General staff College”. The forum served two distinct purposes:

- for U.S. Army officers to engage and interact with the community through an interactive media forum

- for U.S. Army officers to learn valuable lessons in media relations and coherently field questions

The bloggers round table forum is an innovative way for the community and the armed forces to engage in relevant discussion on a variety of topics. Questions brought up during this forum ranged from ROE in Iraq, the different operational environment of Iraq with that in Afghanistan, to the current strategy being utilized in Afghanistan. Bloggers included such participants as professional blogger, Mr. Colin Clark from dodbuzz.com, to Mrs. Dbie Morrison from mysideofthepudle.blogspot.com, a conservative mother with an interest in the U.S. military.

I sensed that participants welcomed the debate and answers given as these were not rehearsed products, rather honest opinions and views from combat veteran junior officers. Engagements such as these are simple to put together and serve as strategic communication combat multipliers, as you can reach a wide audience and are enabled to convey and discuss experiences from the ground level. Transparency is also achieved as the forum in not restricted and all manner of questions are encouraged.

The officers that participated also personally benefited from the media engagement as well. It provided for a non-threatening environment that afforded us the opportunity to learn how to clearly convey one’s message and how to effectively deliver responses. I learned it’s best to write questions down and have a mental strategy as to how best tackle questions. The strategy can involve other members jotting down key points for your use or relaying themes with personal experiences at the tactical and operational level. Another key lesson learned is staying on point within the question being asked with clear and succinct answers instead of long vague responses.

In conclusion, the bloggers round table is an effective forum to engage the public in open discussion. It’s easy to set up and the debate lives on afterwards as bloggers post discussion topics and thoughts on their journals online. Once posted online, this creates more discussion and engages more people as they in turn post comments on the authors’ blogs.

MAJ Sebastian Pastor

US Army, EN

CGSC SG19A

Civilian, Military Officials at Odds Over Resources Needed for Afghan Mission

2009-10-08T06:34:00.001-05:00

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, October 8, 2009

In early March, after weeks of debate across a conference table in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the participants in President Obama's strategic review of the war in Afghanistan figured that the most contentious part of their discussions was behind them. Everyone, save Vice President Biden's national security adviser, agreed that the United States needed to mount a comprehensive counterinsurgency mission to defeat the Taliban.

That conclusion, which was later endorsed by the president and members of his national security team, would become the first in a set of recommendations contained in an administration white paper outlining what Obama called "a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan." Preventing al-Qaeda's return to Afghanistan, the document stated, would require "executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy."

To senior military commanders, the sentence was unambiguous: U.S. and NATO forces would have to change the way they operated in Afghanistan. Instead of focusing on hunting and killing insurgents, the troops would have to concentrate on protecting the good Afghans from the bad ones.

And to carry out such a counterinsurgency effort the way its doctrine prescribes, the military would almost certainly need more boots on the ground.

To some civilians who participated in the strategic review, that conclusion was much less clear. Some took it as inevitable that more troops would be needed, but others thought the thrust of the new approach was to send over scores more diplomats and reconstruction experts. They figured a counterinsurgency mission could be accomplished with the forces already in the country, plus the 17,000 new troops Obama had authorized in February.

"It was easy to say, 'Hey, I support COIN,' because nobody had done the assessment of what it would really take, and nobody had thought through whether we want to do what it takes," said one senior civilian administration official who participated in the review, using the shorthand for counterinsurgency.

Find the rest of the story at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009100704286

The Distance Between ‘We Must’ and ‘We Can’

2009-10-04T20:31:00.002-05:00

New York Times

October 4, 2009
By JAMES TRAUB

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/weekinreview/04traub.html

Over the next few weeks, Barack Obama must make the most difficult decision of his presidency to date: whether or not to send up to 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan, as his commanding general there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has reportedly proposed.

This summer, Mr. Obama described the effort in Afghanistan as “a war of necessity.” In such a war, you do whatever you need to do to win. But now, as criticism mounts from those who argue that the war in Afghanistan cannot, in fact, be won with more troops and a better strategy, the president is having second thoughts.

A war of necessity is presumably one that is “fundamental to the defense of our people,” as Mr. Obama has said about Afghanistan. But if such a war is unwinnable, then perhaps you must reconsider your sense of its necessity and choose a more modest policy instead.

The conservative pundit George Will suggested as much in a recent column in which he argued for a reduced, rather than enhanced, American presence in Afghanistan. Mr. Will cited the testimony of George Kennan, the diplomat and scholar, to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Vietnam in 1966: “Our country should not be asked, and should not ask of itself, to shoulder the main burden of determining the political realities in any other country. ... This is not only not our business, but I don’t think we can do it successfully.”
Mr. Kennan’s astringent counsel has become piercingly relevant today, as Americans discover, time and again, their inability to shape the world as they would wish. Indeed, George W. Bush’s tenure looks in retrospect like an inadvertent proof of the wisdom of restraint, for his ambitious policy to transform the Middle East through regime change and democracy promotion largely ended in failure. The irony is that Mr. Obama, who as a candidate reassured conservative critics that he had read and absorbed the wisdom of Reinhold Niebuhr, Mr. Kennan and other “realists,” is now himself accused of ignoring the limits of American power, like Mr. Bush or Lyndon Johnson, in his pursuit of victory in an unwinnable war.
The idea that American foreign policy must be founded upon a prudent recognition of the country’s capacities and limits, rather than its hopes and wishes, gained currency after World War II, possibly the last unequivocally necessary war in American history. At the war’s end, of course, the global pre-eminence of the United States was beyond question. But Mr. Kennan, Mr. Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau and others tried to imbue their sometimes-grandiose fellow-citizens with a rueful awareness of the intransigence of things.

“The problems of this world are deeper, more involved, and more stubborn than many of us realize,” Mr. Kennan said in a 1949 speech to the Academy of Political Science. “It is imperative, therefore, that we economize with our limited resources and that we apply them where we feel that we will do the most good.”

The realists won that debate. Mr. Kennan argued that a policy of confrontation with Stalin’s Russia, advocated by the more fervent anti-Communists, would be neither effective nor necessary; the Soviets, rather, could be checked by “intelligent long-range policies” designed to counter — to contain — their ambitions. Of course he lost in Vietnam, where the nation-building dreams of a generation of cold war liberals came to grief. The neoconservatives who came to power with George W. Bush were just as dismissive of the cautionary sprit of realism as the liberals of an earlier generation had been, and thought of themselves as conservative heirs of the idealistic tradition of Woodrow Wilson.

Now, as Americans debate whether or not to double down in Afghanistan, it’s striking how opinion is divided not according to left and right, or hawk and dove, but rather by the difference between the Wilsonian “what we must do” and the Kennanite “what we can do.”
Stephen Holmes, a left-leaning law professor at New York University, recently wrote a critique of General McChrystal’s plan that almost exactly echoed Will/Kennan: “Turning an illegitimate government into a legitimate one is simply beyond the capacities of foreigners, however wealthy or militarily unmatched.”

Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., a hawkish Democrat, has reportedly urged the president to devote less of the country’s energies to Afghanistan in order to apply them where they will do the most good — Pakistan. On the other hand, advocates of the proposed new strategy, like Peter Bergen, an expert on Islamic terrorism, invoke America’s “obligation” to the Afghan people and the strategic catastrophe that would come of ceding the country to the Taliban. One side reasons from the means, the other from the ends.

In the real world, of course, the distinction between these two very different dispositions is a fluid one. After all, in a true war of necessity, like World War II, a state and a people summon the capacity to do what must be done, no matter how difficult. So the objective question at the heart of the current debate is whether the battle for Afghanistan represents such a war, or whether — like those for Vietnam or Iraq — the problem that it presents can be solved by less bloody and costly means.

Americans broadly agree that their government must at all costs prevent major attacks on American soil by Al Qaeda. But there the consensus ends, and their questions begin: Do we need to sustain the rickety Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai in order to achieve that objective? If so, will a combination of overwhelming military force and an accompanying civilian surge not only repel the Taliban but make Afghanistan self-sustaining over the long term?

The leaked McChrystal plan argues both that we must and that we can, and that a more modest effort “will likely result in failure.” Critics like the military analyst Andrew Bacevich insist, by contrast, that we cannot and that we need not — that Americans can contain the threat of jihad through such measures as enhanced homeland defense. Others have argued for a middle course involving a smaller troop increase and less nation-building.

George Kennan was right about the cold war. But the question now is whether “containment” is also the right metaphor for Afghanistan, and for the threat of Islamic extremism. Containment (Mr. Kennan also used the imagery of chess and the pruning and pinning of trees) is a metaphor of geographical contiguity. Soviet ambitions could be checked here, conceded there. America’s adversary was not, Mr. Kennan insisted, a global force called Communism; it was Russia, an expansionist but conservative power. By that logic, the United States could lose in Vietnam with no lasting harm to itself.

But Al Qaeda, and jihadism generally, is a global force that seeks control of territory chiefly as a means to carry out its global strategy. It has no borders at which to be checked; its success or failure is measured in ideological rather than territorial terms — like Communism without Russia. Mr. Kennan often suggested that America’s own example of democratic prosperity was one of its most powerful weapons during the cold war; and plainly that is so today as well. That is one weapon with which the threat of Islamic extremism must be challenged; but it is only one.

The question boils down to this: How grave a price would Americans pay if Afghanistan were lost to the Taliban? Would this be a disaster, or merely, as with Vietnam, a terrible misfortune for which the United States could compensate through a contemporary version of Mr. Kennan’s “intelligent long-range policies”? If the latter, then how can Americans justify the immense cost in money and manpower, and the inevitable loss of life, attendant upon General McChrystal’s plan? How can they gamble so much on the corrupt, enfeebled and barely legitimate government of President Karzai? Why insist on seeking to do that which in all probability can not be done?

But what if it’s the former? What if the fall of Kabul would constitute not only an American abandonment of the Afghan people, but a major strategic and psychological triumph for Al Qaeda, and a recruiting tool of unparalleled value? Then the Kennanite calculus would no longer apply, and the fact that nobody can be completely confident that General McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy will work would not be reason enough to forsake it.

In that case — and perhaps only in that case — Afghanistan really would be a war of necessity.

McChrystal Rejects Scaling Down Afghan Military Aims

2009-10-03T07:23:00.003-05:00

New York Times

October 2, 2009
By JOHN F. BURNS

LONDON — The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, used a speech here on Thursday to reject calls for the war effort to be scaled down from defeating the Taliban insurgency to a narrower focus on hunting down Al Qaeda, an option suggested by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. as part of the current White House strategy review.
After his first 100 days in command in Kabul, General McChrystal chose an audience of military specialists at London’s Institute for Strategic Studies as a platform for a public airing of the confidential assessment of the war he delivered to the Pentagon in late August, parts of which were leaked to news organizations. General McChrystal, 55, did not mention Mr. Biden or his advocacy of a scaled-down war effort during his London speech, and referred only obliquely to the debate within the Obama administration on whether to escalate the American commitment in Afghanistan by accepting his request for up to 40,000 more American troops on top of the 68,000 already deployed there or en route.
But he used the London session for a rebuttal of the idea of a more narrowly focused war. When a questioner asked him whether he would support scaling back the American military presence over the next 18 months by relinquishing the battle with the Taliban and focusing on tracking down Al Qaeda, sparing ground troops by hunting Qaeda extremists and their leaders with missiles from remotely piloted aircraft, he replied: “The short answer is: no.”
“You have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish to be,” he said. “A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy.”
In Washington on Thursday, Gen. David H. Petraeus told an audience that he had “not yet endorsed” General McChrystal’s specific request for additional troops, even though he has said he supports General McChrystal’s grim assessment of the war.
General Petraeus, the American commander who oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and works closely with General McChrystal, was sounding a careful note in public after participating in a three-hour strategy meeting with Mr. Obama and the administration’s national security team at the White House on Wednesday. For now, his aides say he does not want to get ahead of the president and the continuing deliberations.
Speaking with Brian Williams of NBC as part of a two-day conference with newsmakers at the Newseum in Washington, General Petraeus said that Wednesday’s meeting at the White House was “a very good and quite long discussion going back and looking at the goals and objectives and assumptions” underlying Mr. Obama’s Afghanistan strategy that the president announced in March.
At the Institute for Strategic Studies, General McChrystal noted that the former Taliban rulers of Afghanistan had provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda, from which it planned the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, and he said political stability there was vital to regional security, as well as to the security of Britain, the United States and elsewhere.
Advocating a “counterterrorist focus” in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, instead of a “counterinsurgency focus” against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, he said, was a formula for what he called “Chaos-istan.” Proponents of that approach, he said, would accept an Afghanistan in which there was “a level of chaos, and just manage it from outside.”
The general’s troop request was at the heart of the White House strategy session on Wednesday led by Mr. Obama, which included Mr. Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, other cabinet secretaries, top generals, and General McChrystal, participating by videolink from London. The request has come as the worsening conflict in Afghanistan has prompted increased unease in the United States and Europe.
In an oblique acknowledgment of the tricky political terrain, General McChrystal said there had been no pressure on him from military superiors to scale down his troop request — a pattern that developed at points during the Iraq war, when American generals hesitated to call for more troops after the defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, ruled them out.
“All of the interaction I’ve had with my senior leadership, they’ve not only encouraged me” to be blunt in stating his case, the general said, “they’ve insisted on it.”
As if in an afterthought, he added, laughing, that there was no certainty he would always be so free to speak so plainly. “They may change their minds and crush me some day,” he said.
General McChrystal was named the new American and allied commander in Afghanistan this summer in succession to Gen. David D. McKiernan, who was removed after barely a year in the job, and retired, when Mr. Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates decided they needed a fresh approach.
But direct contact between Mr. Obama and the Afghanistan commander has been rare. Aides in London said that Wednesday’s teleconference was only the second time since General McChrystal assumed his command in June that the two men had talked by videolink, a form of contact with field commanders that President George W. Bush, at the height of the Iraq war, used as often as once a week. Although he was out of Afghanistan on Wednesday, the aides said, General McChrystal was not invited to attend the White House strategy session in person.
But judging from General McChrystal’s relaxed demeanor at the session in London, any suggestion he might be headed for a showdown with the White House over war strategy — for the kind of clash that Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur had with President Truman during the Korean War — seemed far-fetched. He went out of his way to say that the White House strategy review was an essential part of developing a successful approach to the war. “I think the more deliberation and the more debate we have, the healthier that’s going to be,” he said.
In the war assessment he delivered to the Pentagon, he struck a note of urgency, saying that if the troop increases he had recommended were not in place within 12 months, the allied effort risked failure. But he told the London audience that the time being taken by current policy review in Washington was worth it. “I don’t think we have the luxury of going so fast that we make the wrong decision,” he said.
The general has used his London trip to make a renewed bid for an increase in Britain’s troop commitment in Afghanistan. With 9,000 soldiers, Britain currently has the second largest coalition contingent after the Americans. Officials at Britain’s Defense Ministry have said discussions with the Americans have included the possibility of about 2,500 additional troops in the British contingent.

Special Address - General Stanley McChrystal

2009-10-02T06:44:00.005-05:00

International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)

General Stanley McChrystal Address

1 October 2009

General Stanley McChrystal
Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

and

Commander, US Forces Afghanistan

http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-stanley-mcchrystal-address/

I. Preamble
　
It is an honour for me to be here and I would like to thank you for giving me the time. I would also like to thank not only my hosts but also all of you who took time to be here today. This is an extraordinarily important subject: we have young people – not only from the coalition but also young Afghans – in the field today, who depend on the decisions we make and the analysis we do. Taking the time to talk and think about it is always time well-spent, so I thank you for that.

I am privileged to speak here today as the Commander of NATO’s ISAF forces, representing people from 42 troop-contributing nations. I represent them today and I hope to do that well. As you know, I have a British deputy, Lieutenant General Jim Dutton, who is coming to the end of his term and will soon be replaced by another great British officer, Lieutenant General Nick Parker.

Before I continue, I would like to recognise the enormous sacrifice that families here in the UK have made. As you know, the losses that we have suffered are significant in terms of those who have fallen, suffered life-changing injuries, or given up parts of their life just by being away from family. I am in awe of the performance of the British brothers whom I have been honoured to work with for a number of years now.

I am humbled to be here because I do not claim to be in the same category as people who have been talking here, such as Prime Minister Brown and President Zardari, who expressed their views on this complex subject. I do, however, believe that I can offer some perspectives and will try to do that today. I will start by posing seven questions before attempting to answer them. If this works according to my plan, it will totally exhaust your appetite for this issue and I will leave the room to wild cheers and lucrative job offers. If my plan fails, as most of mine do, I will be happy to field any questions that we have time for.

II. What is the Right Approach to Use in Afghanistan?

1. People’s Own Suggestions
　
People ask me this question all the time; many people offer their own suggestions. There is a multitude of approaches to what to do. Some people say that we should focus primarily on development; others say that we should conduct a counterterrorist-focused battle, given that this really started after 9/11 and Al-Qaeda’s strikes. Other people say that we should conduct counterinsurgency (COIN). A paper has been written that recommends that we use a plan called ‘Chaosistan’, and that we let Afghanistan become a Somalia-like haven of chaos that we simply manage from outside.

2. The Complexities of Afghanistan

a. The delicate balance of power
　
I arrived in Afghanistan in May 2002 and I have spent a part of every year since then involved in the effort. I have learned a tremendous amount about it and, every day, I realise how little about Afghanistan I actually understand. I discount immediately anyone who simplifies the problem or offers a solution, because they have absolutely no idea of the complexity of what we are dealing with.

In Afghanistan, things are rarely as they seem, and the outcomes of actions we take, however well-intended, are often different from what we expect. If you pull the lever, the outcome is not what you have been programmed to think. For example, digging a well sounds quite simple. How could you do anything wrong by digging a well to give people clean water? Where you build that well, who controls that water, and what water it taps into all have tremendous implications and create great passion.

If you build a well in the wrong place in a village, you may have shifted the basis of power in that village. If you tap into underground water, you give power to the owner of that well that they did not have before, because the traditional irrigation system was community-owned. If you dig a well and contract it to one person or group over another, you make a decision that, perhaps in your ignorance, tips the balance of power, or perception thereof, in that village.

Therefore, with a completely altruistic aim of building a well, you can create divisiveness or give the impression that you, from the outside, do not understand what is going on or that you have sided with one element or another, yet all you tried to do is provide water.

b. COIN mathematics
　
There is another complexity that people do not understand and which the military have to learn: I call it ‘COIN mathematics’. Intelligence will normally tell us how many insurgents are operating in an area. Let us say that there are 10 in a certain area. Following a military operation, two are killed. How many insurgents are left? Traditional mathematics would say that eight would be left, but there may only be two, because six of the living eight may have said, ‘This business of insurgency is becoming dangerous so I am going to do something else.’

There are more likely to be as many as 20, because each one you killed has a brother, father, son and friends, who do not necessarily think that they were killed because they were doing something wrong. It does not matter – you killed them. Suddenly, then, there may be 20, making the calculus of military operations very different. Yet we are asking young corporals, sergeants and lieutenants to make those kinds of calculations and requiring them to understand the situation. They have to – there is no simple workaround.

It is that complex: where you build the well, what military operations to run, who you talk to. Everything that you do is part of a complex system with expected and unexpected, desired and undesired outcomes, and outcomes that you never find out about. In my experience, I have found that the best answers and approaches may be counterintuitive; i.e. the opposite of what it seems like you ought to do is what ought to be done. When I am asked what approach we should take in Afghanistan, I say ‘humility’.

III. What Environment Are We Operating In?

1. Generally Accepted Truths
　
The answer to this question starts with some generally accepted truths about Afghanistan, which we all know to be true:

It is a graveyard of empires.

Afghanistan has never been ruled by a strong central government.

Afghans do not consider themselves Afghans.

All three are untrue. If you ask an Afghan what he is, he will say, ‘I am an Afghan’. There have been strong central governments, although different from what you think of as central government. In the sense of governance, there have been periods when Afghanistan absolutely had a central government. Therefore, we have to start by not accepting any of the generally accepted ‘bumper sticker’ truths.

2. Real Truths

a. Complex, difficult geography and demography
　
In terms of real truths, it is complex, difficult terrain, both in terms of land and people. It is also a tribal society with a culture that is vastly different from what most of us are familiar with. There are variations around the country; you cannot assume that what is true in one province is true in another. That goes for ethnic, geographic and economic issues. You cannot even assume that what is true in one valley is true in the next any more than you can assume that one neighbourhood in London is exactly the same as another. We would not generalise here, yet sometimes, as outsiders, we want to do that.

b. A long period of conflict
　
I would also remind people that we have been waging a war for eight years, yet the Afghans have been at it for 30. Life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44 years, so not many people remember pre-conflict life in Afghanistan. Of those 30 years, about 10 were spent fighting the Soviets, followed by six years of ‘warlordism’ and a further six years of Taliban rule and civil rule, and the last eight years have been eight more years of fighting.

One elder said something that really struck me one night as we were talking: ‘What you see in Afghanistan now is a reflection of pieces of each of those eras’. It is now a mosaic of the experiences of all those eras. If you think about the impact of 30 years on people and on a society, calculations change. The certainty that you have when you walk through your neighbourhood in London is not the certainty that they have. The expectation of the future is not the expectation that they may have. The opportunities to be educated and to associate with different ethnic groups, which have become more of a challenge in recent years, are very different.

c. A damaged society
　
The society is what I would call ‘damaged’. Individuals may not be damaged, but the society is not as it was. It is not so uniformly; nor can you say ‘it is all different here’. Tribal structures, relationships and expectations are uncertain now. When you go into a village in a Pashtun area, traditionally you could have predicted what the role and interrelationships of the mullah or the elders would be. That is no longer true. It varies based upon the experience of that area. In some areas, some have disproportionate influence and others have none. Some have been killed. In other cases, elements like the Taliban have come in and completely turned upside down the traditional structures. You can also not assume that traditional structures have disappeared, so you have to go in and learn what the structure is and how people deal with it.

3. A Uniquely Complex Environment
　
What we face, then, is a uniquely complex environment, where there are at least three regional and resilient insurgencies, with further sub-insurgencies. They have intersected on top of a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of war. You then run into someone who raises their finger and says ‘here is the solution’ – they can have my job.

4. A Crisis of Confidence
　
We also face a crisis of confidence. Afghans are frustrated after the most recent eight years of war, because in 2001 their expectations skyrocketed. Along with the arrival of coalition forces, they expected a positive change. They saw that initially and then waited for other changes – economic development and improvements in governance – that, in many cases, may have been unrealistic but, in many cases, were unmet. Therefore, there was a mismatch between what they had hoped for and what they have experienced. Again, as we learn in all societies, expectations and perceptions often matter as much as the reality.

IV. What Is the Situation Now?

1. Serious and Deteriorating
　
The situation is serious, and I choose that word very carefully. I would add that neither success nor failure for our endeavour in support of the Afghan people and government can be taken for granted. My assessment and my best military judgment is that the situation is, in some ways, deteriorating, but not in all ways.

2. Tremendous Progress
　
I can also point out areas in which tremendous progress is evident: the construction of roads, provision of clean water, access to healthcare, the presence of children in school, and access to education for females. All of these are up dramatically and hugely positive, and portend well for the future.

3. A Need to Reverse Current Trends
　
However, a tremendous number of villagers live in fear, and there are officials who either cannot or do not serve their people effectively. Violence is on the increase, not only because there are more coalition forces, but also because the insurgency has grown. We need to reverse the current trends, and time does matter. Waiting does not prolong a favourable outcome. This effort will not remain winnable indefinitely, and nor will public support. However, the cruel irony is that, in order to succeed, we need patience, discipline, resolve and time.

V. Who is Winning?

1. A Battle of Minds and Perceptions

a. Not a game with points on a scoreboard
　
The answer to this question depends on who you ask. This is not like a football game with points on a scoreboard; it is more like a political debate, after which both sides announce that they won. That matters because we are not the scorekeepers: not NATO ISAF, not our governments, and not even our press. The perception of all of these entities will matter and they will affect the situation, but ultimately this is going to be decided in the minds and perceptions of the Afghan people of the Afghan government and of the insurgents, whether they can win or are winning, and, most importantly, the perception of the villager who casts his lot with the winner.

b. Villagers make rational and practical decisions
　
Villagers are supremely rational and practical people: they make the decision on who they will support, based upon who can protect them and provide for them what they need. If a villager lives in a remote area where the government or security forces cannot protect them from coercion or harm from insurgents, he will not support the government – it would be illogical. Similarly, if the government cannot provide him with rule of law, the basic ability to adjudicate requirements legally, or just enough services to allow him to pursue a likelihood, it is difficult for him to make a rational decision to support the government. The Taliban is not popular. It does not have a compelling context. What it has is proximity to the people and the ability to provide coercion and, in some cases, things like basic rule of law, based upon the fact that they are there and can put themselves in that position. The perception of the villager matters in terms of which side he should support, so winning the battle of perception is key.

c. Allowing the facts to speak for themselves
　
I also think that winning the battle of perception, as it applies everywhere but particularly to us, is about credibility. As I told you, the situation is absolutely not deteriorating by every indicator, but I will not stand up and say that we are winning until I am told by indicators that we are winning. For me to stand up and claim good things that are not supported by data in order to motivate us and make us feel good very rapidly undermines our credibility. Our own forces are smart enough to do that, so I intend to tell people the best assessment that we can, as accurately as possible, and allow the facts to speak for themselves.

VI. It Has Been Eight Years – Why Is It Not Better?
　
This is a fair question for the Afghan people and for societies that have supported this effort. It is true that, after eight years of tremendous effort and expenditure and the loss of good people, many things are worse. Why have eight years of effort not made things better? There are a number of complex reasons:

The insurgency grew.

Expectations – both expected and unexpected – were not met, which has created frustration.

It took us longer than I wish it had to recognise this as a serious insurgency. As the Taliban started to regain its effectiveness, we lagged in terms of accepting that as a clear reality.

Through our actions, we – i.e. the coalition and its Afghan partners – sometimes exacerbate the problems.

We have under-resourced our operations.

In some areas, we have underperformed; in others, we have under-coordinated.

We have struggled with unity of effort, national agreements and chains of command that are complex to say the least.

In some ways, we have not overcome some of our intrinsic disadvantages. We are operating in a very different culture, with language differences, relationships that do not exist and a complex situation that takes time to understand, yet we have not effectively developed enough expertise, continuity of people or sufficient numbers of language-trained people to deal with the situation as effectively as we could have.

Most importantly, our own operational culture – and by ‘our’ I mean coalition forces – and manner of operating distances us physically and psychologically from the people who we seek to protect. We need to connect with people, yet physical or linguistic barriers make it increasingly difficult. Ultimately, our security comes from the people. We cannot build enough walls to protect ourselves if the people do not.

We must, then, operate and think in a fundamentally new way.

VII. Can We Succeed?

1. Protecting the Afghan People from the Enemy
　
We can succeed. We must redefine the fight. The objective is the will of the Afghan people. We must protect the Afghan people from all threats: from the enemy and from our own actions. Let me describe it: a few days ago, just before we left to travel here, a bus south of Kandahar struck an improvised explosive device (IED) killing 30 Afghan civilians. That is tragic.

On the one hand, you might say that the Afghan people would recoil against the Taliban who left that IED. To a degree, they do, but we must also understand that they recoil against us because they might think that, if we were not there, neither would be the IED. Therefore, we indirectly caused the IED to be there. Second, we said that we would protect them, but we did not. Sometimes, then, the most horrific events caused by the insurgents continue to reinforce in the minds of the Afghan people a mindset that coalition forces are either ineffective, or at least that their presence in Afghanistan is not in their interest. That does not happen all of the time. There are times when they feel differently, but you have to put things in that context to understand what we must do.

2. Protection from Our Own Actions

a. Respecting the people
　
We also need to protect them from our own actions. When we fight, if we become focused on destroying the enemy but end up killing Afghan civilians, destroying Afghan property or acting in a way that is perceived as arrogant, we convince the Afghan people that we do not care about them. If we say, ‘We are here for you – we respect and want to protect you’, while destroying their home, killing their relatives or destroying their crops, it is difficult for them to connect those two concepts. It would be difficult for us to do the same. The understanding, then, must be that we respect the people.

b. Changing our mindset
　
We must assign responsibility because, ultimately, the Afghans must defeat the insurgency. As a force, however, we must change our mindset. Whether or not we like it, we have a conventional warfare culture – not just our militaries but our societies. Our societies want to see lines on a map moving forward towards objectives, but you will not see that in a counterinsurgency because you do not see as clearly what is happening in people’s minds. We will have to do things dramatically and even uncomfortably differently in order to change how we think and operate.

In short, we cannot succeed by simply trying harder. We cannot drop three more bombs and have a greater effect; it is much more subtle than that.

3. Crucial Next Steps

In my mind, therefore, what we must do over the next period of time is:

Gain the initiative by reversing the perceived momentum possessed by the insurgents.

Seek rapid growth of Afghan national security forces – the army and the police.

Improve their effectiveness and ours through closer partnering, which involves planning, living and operating together and taking advantage of each other’s strengths as we go forward. Within ISAF, we will put more emphasis on every part of that, by integrating our headquarters, physically co-locating our units, and sharing ownership of the problem.

Address shortfalls in the capacity of governance and the ability of the Afghan government to provide rule of law.

Tackle the issue of predatory corruption by some officials or by warlords who are not in an official position but who seem to have the ability, sometimes sanctioned by existing conditions, to do that.

Focus our resources and prioritise in those areas where the population is most threatened. We do not have enough forces to do everything everywhere at once, so this has to be prioritised and phased over time.

4. A Need for Resolve
　
As you know, the concepts that I have outlined here are not new, but if we implement them aggressively and effectively, we can create a revolution in terms of our effectiveness. We must show resolve. Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe. A villager recently asked me whether we intended to remain in his village and provide security, to which I confidently promised him that, of course, we would. He looked at me and said, ‘Okay, but you did not stay last time.’

VIII. Why Bother?

1. The Risk Posed by Al-Qaeda
　
Afghanistan is difficult, so why bother? It is a long way away. It is not our business. As we know, however, 9/11 brought us here to the latest interaction, and transnational terrorist threats absolutely remain. I believe that the loss of stability in Afghanistan brings a huge risk that transnational terrorists such as Al-Qaeda will operate from within Afghanistan again.

2. High Stakes for Afghanistan and the Region
　
I also believe that the stakes are high for Afghanistan and for the region. An unstable Afghanistan not only negatively affects what happens within its borders but also affects its neighbours. Afghanistan is, in many ways, one of the keys to stability in south Asia. A state that can provide its own security is important to all international security, and certainly to that of the UK, the US and our international partnership. The Afghan people are worth bothering about and they deserve that.

IX. Conclusion

In conclusion, I am exceptionally proud to serve at ISAF. Within my office, I have a picture of a British battle group, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gus Fair, with whom I worked for a long time in Iraq. He is with his soldiers, who I had the opportunity to speak with when I visited them during operations in Spin Majid this summer in the Helmand River valley. I keep that picture because, when I looked into their eyes, which were bloodshot with fatigue, I remember the extraordinary professionalism, competence and sheer courage of those young men. Whenever I come to London, I like to run through the city, and I particularly like the statues that you have erected to heroes. I hope that you erect one to that generation – they have earned it. Thank you.

GOLD STAR MOTHERS DAY

2009-09-28T06:27:00.004-05:00

Mothers of fallen servicemembers began calling themselves “Gold Star Mothers” during the First World War, but the sorrowful bond they share reaches back to every woman who has lost a son or daughter in uniform since our nation’s revolution. The Army cherishes the mothers of its Soldiers as bedrocks of support and comfort, and honors the mothers of its fallen as resilient legacies of their children’s service. The United States began observing Gold Star Mothers Day on the last Sunday of September in 1936. This year, the Army joins the nation on September 27th in recognizing the sacrifice and strength of its Gold Star Mothers.

Northeast Kansas Chapter
http://www.goldstarmoms.com/Depts/KS/NEKansasChapt/NEKansas.htm

Video:
http://www.army.mil/media/amp/?bcpid=6981683001&bcpid=20104047001&bclid=38457190001&bctid=42040359001

Related links:
http://www.goldstarmoms.com/

http://www.army.mil/goldstarmothers/?ref=home-spot0-title

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55987

Command and General Staff College CSM talks to Staff Group 19A

2009-09-19T20:00:00.007-05:00

On 18 September 2009, CSM Johndrow, the Command and General Staff College Command Sergeant Major, spoke to the officers of Staff Group 19A, in answer to the group's invitation. He spoke on multiple topics, but the central theme was clearly on the Soldier, which was a welcome refresher in a curriculum of strategy, force management, and organizational-level leadership. CSM Johndrow's comments to the class demonstrated the importance for non-commissioned officer involvement in an officer's professional military education; the relationship between officer and non-commissioned officer counterparts is essential in our units and needs to be mirrored in the classroom.

His easy conversational style and approachable demeanor helped to convey the important take aways from his time in our classroom:

- Trust and transparency are essential, especially to tear down the stereotypical wall between officer and non-commissioned officer "business". Officers must trust their NCOs to handle issues at their levels while NCOs need to keep their officers informed of the basics.

- Let those high-speed NCOs go from the S3 shop after they've received professional development and have contributed to the battalion after a while. It's not healthy to keep that NCO that knows land and ammunition so well chained to his desk; get him back out there in a platoon.

- Rear Detachment is an essential command. If it doesn't hurt to nominate and let that officer and NCO go to be the rear commander and sergeant major then they aren't the right choice.- a mirror is the most important piece of furniture in your home, not simply for your physical appearance, but for the personal reflection it provides. Look yourself in the eye.

- Need for a personal relationship between the S3, XO, and CSM in the battalion, again based on trust.

We were honored to have him speak with us and if this constitutes the "wrap-around" following a guest speaker, then Staff Group 19A strongly agrees that he contributed to the curriculum for adaptive and agile leaders and hopes that more groups bring him into their classrooms.

For more information on CSM Phil Johndrow go to: http://www.cgsc.edu/leadership.asp

MAJ Tim Gallagher

US Army, LG

CGSC SG19A

Twin majors have leapfrog careers

2009-09-17T12:26:00.003-05:00

Twin majors have leapfrog careers
Fort Leavenworth Lamp
By Tisha Johnson Staff WriterPublished: Thursday, September 17, 2009 12:17 PM

Majors Clydellia "Dellia" Prichard-Allen and Clydea "Dea" Prichard-Brown, twins in the Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education 2010-01 class, pick up their 3-year-old daughters Kristian Allen and Zaria Brown at the Child Development Center Sept. 1. The twins also have 9-year-old sons, Michael Allen Jr. and Zion Brown. Lamp photo by Prudence Siebert.

Twin sisters currently attending the Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education say their lives, including their military careers, have leapfrogged each other through the years.Nicknamed Dea and Dellia, Majors Clydea Prichard-Brown and Clydellia Prichard-Allen, are named after their grandfather, Clyde Keys.The pair graduated a year early from high school. They were attending Mercer University in Macon, Ga., as electrical engineering majors and modeling to help pay for college when Prichard-Allen did something that changed both of their lives - she enlisted in the Army.

The idea of military service was not foreign to the sisters - their mother was in the Women's Army Corps for a year and a half, and they say they have many other members of their extended family who have been in the military.When Prichard-Allen enlisted in the Army Reserve in 1989, her sister resisted."She wasn't so apt to go in, she was modeling still," Prichard-Allen said.

Prichard-Allen said she joined because she discovered the student loan repayment program. Their mother, a single mom, had been helping them pay for college and had used some of her retirement money to do so."I was probably the recruiter's best recruit," Prichard-Allen said."And I was fighting it," Prichard-Brown laughed.

Then, Prichard-Brown said she realized how well the military was treating her sister."I saw she was living so well, the Army was paying for everything, she had her own car ... I was still at home with mom and I said, Yeah, this is what I want,'" Prichard-Brown said.Prichard-Brown enlisted into active duty in 1991. And her sister, who was deployed as part of Desert Storm at the time, decided to stay on active duty after her deployment.

"When she went active duty, I said, 'You know what? I'll go active duty as well,' because I was enjoying it," Prichard-Allen said.Both of the sisters made their way to sergeant and were eligible to be promoted to staff sergeant when they found the Green to Gold program - a year apart.The last to join the Army, Prichard-Brown was the first to receive a scholarship for the program in 1995. She received her commission in 1997, graduating magna cum laude with a degree in criminal justice from Indiana University, Purdue University of Indianapolis. Prichard-Brown was a distinguished military graduate, a George C. Marshall Award recipient and the first minority and first female cadet battalion commander in the history of the school's ROTC program.

Prichard-Allen was awarded a Green to Gold scholarship in 1996 and received her commission in 1998, graduating cum laude with a degree in psychology from South Carolina State University. Prichard-Allen was a distinguished military graduate, a George C. Marshall Award recipient and the first cadet brigade commander for the school's ROTC program, a new position at the school.Wearing the same U.S. Army Central Command combat patch they earned 17 years apart, this is the first time the sisters have been stationed together.Last year Prichard-Brown was scheduled to come to CGSC, but was diverted and deployed to Kuwait. While she was there she knew she was going to be coming to ILE next and called her sister about it.

"So we talked about it. I said, 'Hey, look, I'm going to school. Why don't you go to school?'" Prichard-Brown said. "We hadn't been together in 20 years."Prichard-Brown is here with her husband of 17 years, Rick Brown, her 9-year-old son Zion and 3-year-old daughter Zaria. Her husband, an Army veteran, works for the General Services Adminstration in Kansas City.Prichard-Allen is here with her 3-year-old daughter Kristian. Her husband of 14 years, Sgt. 1st Class Michael Allen, is still stationed in the D.C. area with their 9-year-old son Michael Allen Jr.

The sisters say they did not plan to have their children close together like they did, but like everything else in their lives that have leapfrogged, it was simply coincidence."Our sons are seven months apart and our daughters are five months apart," Prichard-Brown laughed.The sisters said family has always been a driving force in their lives. Like many twins, they said they rely on each other, but their mother and grandparents have also been important in their lives.
Prichard-Allen said their mother has been the rock in their lives. She was a single mother who raised four children. She said they do everything they can to make her proud."She has been the one to actually encourage us to continue," Prichard-Allen said. "She is the backbone for us.""In everything we do," the sisters said in unison.

Prichard-Brown said their mother wanted them to identify with what they wanted to do."We grew up with discipline and leadership," Prichard-Brown said.The sisters say they value their enlisted time in the Army, and their time as noncommissioned officers.In different staff groups at CGSC, the pair say they bring some insight to their groups with their prior service."As leaders we have to understand our Soldiers, so if you were the Soldier at one time ... we are giving them (staff groups) a better insight," Prichard-Brown said.Through the years, they have remained each other's mentors, they said. Prichard-Brown is a logistics officer with almost 17 years of active-duty service. Prichard-Allen is an Adjutant General officer with more than 18 years of service."When I was in command in Alaska, I would call her all the time and say 'What do you think about this?'" Prichard-Allen said. "I would be her sounding board as well."

http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles/2009/09/17/features/features1.txt

TRADOC Commander's Blog on SWJ

2009-09-16T21:37:00.005-05:00

Below is a blog that was posted on the Small Wars Journal last month by GEN Dempsey, Commanding General for US Army TRADOC.

First, GEN Dempsey leads by showing the power of the blog and the opportunities it possess to stimulate intellectual discussion. Embracing the Culture of Engagement.

He then briefly defines hybrid threats and three imperatives that must guide our efforts. The bottom line I hear is, "Leader Development." If in fact we continue to correctly develop leaders we will be able to achieve these imperatives, our fours roles in the defense strategy, and the six qualities in order to face the requirements of 21st Century conflict as out lined in the CSA's White Paper.

Take a look at this blog and the CSA's White Paper. What is your bottom line?

MAJ Phil Kiniery
IN, US Army
CGSC SG19A

TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference
Posted by Martin Dempsey on August 13, 2009 2:38 PM
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/tradoc-senior-leaders-conferen/

I first want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the important issues facing us and to gain your perspectives and insights on the critical task of adapting our institution to more effectively support the nation’s national security interests. I view Small Wars Journal as an important gathering place for strategic thought, and I appreciate the opportunity to collaborate with some of the most thoughtful minds in our country.

The upcoming TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference (TSLC) in Gettysburg comes at an important time for Training and Doctrine Command and for our Army. We continue to transform TRADOC while simultaneously supporting transitions in both OIF and OEF. Let me offer some thoughts and considerations as we put our shoulders behind these challenges and opportunities over the next 2 years.

If our experience over the last eight years has taught us anything, it’s that war and conflict will continue to increase in complexity. We know that conflict will be waged among the population and for influence on the population, and we know our leaders and their soldiers will operate among a diverse set of actors along blurred military, political, economic, religious and ethnic lines with the potential for escalation and spillover in a variety of unpredictable ways.

Hybrid threats--combinations of regular military forces and irregular threats often in collaboration with criminal and terrorist elements--will migrate among operational themes to seek advantage. The operating environment will become more competitive as our adversaries decentralize, network, and gain technological capabilities formerly found only in the hands of nation states.

The challenge confronting us is building balance and versatility into the force by developing our leaders, by designing our organizations, and by adapting the institution. The outcomes we seek are flexibility and resilience to hedge against future uncertainty. Three imperatives are guiding our efforts to align the operational and institutional Army to meet demands and support the
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model:

• Develop our military and civilian leaders
• Provide trained and ready forces to support current operations
• Integrate current and emerging capabilities

These imperatives will remain in tension for the foreseeable future, but there are things we can do to bring them into better balance.

The TRADOC Campaign Plan (TCP) describes how we’ll achieve balance across our priority lines of operation: Human Capital, Initial Military Training, Leader Development, and Capabilities Integration.

The focus of our discussions during the TSLC will be on the TRADOC Campaign Plan (TCP). We will also examine how TRADOC’s TCP aligns with and complements the Human Capital Enterprise. We'll demonstrate how the Central Training Database will become the “Training Brain” for TRADOC and provide us the opportunity to enhance training in the institutional schoolhouse.

As you may know, we've asked ourselves how we can replicate the complexity our leaders experience while they are deployed, and we will discuss some emerging opportunities to do just that. I'd like this to generate discussion about how TRADOC can lead innovation in training and education to account for the speed of change in the contemporary operating environment.
I look forward in the coming weeks to a lively, thoughtful discussion with the Small Wars Journal community.

Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge U.S. Afghan Force

2009-09-16T05:45:00.002-05:00

NEW YORK TIMES September 16, 2009
By THOM SHANKER

WASHINGTON — The nation’s top military officer pushed back Tuesday against Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time.

That assessment by the officer, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stopped short of an explicit request for more troops. But it signals that the military intends to have a public voice in the evolving debate as many Democrats express reluctance to expand the war and President Obama weighs options.

Admiral Mullen, called before the Senate Armed Services Committee to testify for his nomination to serve a second term as chairman, said that no specific request for more troops had yet been received from Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the senior American and NATO commander in Afghanistan.

“But I do believe that — having heard his views and having great confidence in his leadership — a properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more forces, and, without question, more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of good governance,” Admiral Mullen said.

Admiral Mullen’s comments were his most specific to date in a public setting on whether more troops would have to be sent to Afghanistan.

The debate will probably be affected by the mounting political uncertainty in Afghanistan. Election officials said one out of every seven ballots cast in the presidential election last month would be examined as part of a huge recount and fraud audit.

A range of officials have said that the White House hopes to have at least several weeks before having to deal with any request for more forces for Afghanistan — and the political implications of such a request here at home. But Tuesday’s debate on Capitol Hill, which framed the arguments for how to shape the mission, indicates that the sweeping public discussion is already under way.

The military’s counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan is focused on protecting the population and preventing the Taliban from destabilizing the country.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has not yet decided whether to support a request from commanders in Kabul for more troops, should it be made. A group of about 4,000 trainers is scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan by November, bringing the American troop level there to 68,000.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said Tuesday that Mr. Gates’s initial opposition to expanding the American “footprint” in Afghanistan had at least been softened.

Previously, Mr. Gates expressed apprehension over a force so sizable that Afghans would view the Americans as occupiers. Now, Mr. Morrell said, the defense secretary was taking to heart General McChrystal’s “explanation that it’s not so much the size of the force, but the behavior of the force that determines whether or not it is accepted by the Afghan people.”

During Admiral Mullen’s appearance before the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee’s chairman, laid out the emerging position of Congressional

Democrats by insisting that accelerated efforts to train and equip Afghan security forces should precede any deployment of American troops beyond those already committed by the Obama administration. Mr. Levin’s stance is expected to have great sway because he is the committee’s chairman and the most powerful Democrat in Congress on military matters. Many House Democrats also oppose sending more troops.

But the committee’s ranking Republican, Senator John McCain of Arizona, countered by asserting that more troops were “vitally needed” in Afghanistan and that any delay in ordering more combat forces to the fight would put American lives at risk.
Admiral Mullen acknowledged the importance of the training effort advocated by Mr. Levin, but said that such a mission could not quickly provide the level of security required by the new counterinsurgency strategy.

“I share your view that larger and more capable Afghan national security forces remain vital to that nation’s viability,” Admiral Mullen said. “We must rapidly build the Afghan Army and police.”

But he also said that “sending more trainers more quickly may give us a jump start, but only that.”

“Quality training takes time and patience,” he continued. “Private trust by the Afghans — so vital to our purpose — is not fostered in a public hurry.”

Mr. Levin, who met with commanders and troops in Afghanistan during Congress’s Labor Day recess, said that training Afghan Army and police units “would demonstrate our commitment to the success of a mission that is in our national security interest, while avoiding the risks associated with a larger U.S. footprint.”

And he said that “these steps should be urgently implemented before we consider a further increase in U.S. ground combat troops, beyond what is already planned to be deployed by the end of the year.”

Mr. Levin said new goals should be established for Afghan security forces. The army, he said, should grow to 250,000 troops by the end of 2012, and the police to 160,000 officers by that date. The current targets are 134,000 army troops and 96,000 police officers by the end of next year.

Mr. McCain staked out an opposing view. He recalled that initial attempts in Iraq to shift the security burden to local forces from American forces were a colossal failure. “I’ve seen that movie before,” he said.

“I’ve been encouraged over the past year by the statements and actions of the president and the unequivocal priority he has placed on achieving success in Afghanistan,” Mr. McCain said. “The president’s approval of increases in troop strength was needed then, and I believe even more necessary now.”

Other members of the committee said the civilian agencies of the United States government needed to accelerate their assistance for rebuilding Afghanistan.

Mr. Obama said Monday that the public should “not expect a sudden announcement of some huge change in strategy,” and he pledged that the issue was “going to be amply debated, not just in Congress, but across the country before we make any further decisions.”

During a news conference, Mr. Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, also pointed out a contradiction in the argument of those who support trainers but not more combat troops, because mentoring by American trainers includes joining local forces when they go out on combat missions.

On General Krulak's E-mail to George Will

2009-09-12T09:17:00.003-05:00

Posted by Paul Yingling on September 11, 2009 4:43 AM
From Small Wars Journal

Ten years ago, the ideas about warfare expressed in General Krulak's email to George Will would have been merely disappointing. However, after eight years of war have we have learned many hard lessons at a very high price, and the ideas attributed to General Krulak are now incomprehensible.

General Krulak appears unsure as to whether al-Qaeda and the Taliban are our enemies, and whether the United States has an interest in preventing Taliban control of Afghanistan. Exactly eight years ago today, al-Qaeda operatives supported by the Taliban-controlled government of Afghanistan murdered 3,000 Americans on American soil. The answer to the general's question is yes - al-Qaeda and the Taliban are America's enemies.

General Krulak advocates the use of 'hunter-killer teams' backed by airpower governed by minimal rules of engagement to 'take out the bad guys.' This light footprint tactic has failed for the last eight years. Aircraft operating with few or no ground forces cannot distinguish between insurgents and innocent civilians. Minimal rules of engagement result in maximum civilian casualties, tacitly assisting our enemies as they seek sanctuary and support from civilian populations.

General Krulak misrepresents the manpower requirements necessary for success in Afghanistan. Most of the troops required to provide security for the Afghan people can and will come from the Afghans themselves. Indeed, the most important task for American military forces is to strengthen the capabilities of Afghan security forces to accomplish this task.

General Krulak speculates that the American people would not provide the resources necessary to prevail in Afghanistan. While every citizen is entitled to his or her opinion, it's not clear that General Krulak has any particular expertise in the area of domestic American political opinion.

What's more certain is that the American people and their elected representatives have provided virtually everything asked of them by our military leaders. If there are insufficient resources to prevail in Afghanistan, it is the responsibility of senior military officers and other leaders within the executive branch to ask for more. It is dismaying that a retired general officer would advocate abandoning the war in Afghanistan out of concern for its impact on military personnel or equipment. We must tailor our forces to meet the demands of our wars, rather than vice versa.

After eight years of war, we have learned some hard lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, including:

* Al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates pose a serious threat to the security of the United States, our people and our allies
* Airpower and special operations forces are a necessary part of any counter-terrorism operation, but in and of themselves are insufficient to deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations.
* Developing host-nation security forces is an essential component of counterinsurgency operations. These forces are more credible, more enduring and more cost-effective than relying exclusively or primarily on U.S. forces.
* It is the responsibility of general officers to ask for the resources necessary to win our wars.

I respect General Krulak for his decades of service to our country. However, I was dismayed that any officer, active or retired, could still hold the views attributed to him on September 11, 2009.

Posted by Paul Yingling on September 11, 2009 4:43 AM

More information on SWJ at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/on-general-krulaks-email-to-ge/#c004330

2009-09-12T09:12:00.002-05:00

The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage?

Posted by SWJ Editors on September 11, 2009 4:19 PM
From Small Wars Journal

A Miltary Review twofer on the military-media relationship:

The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage? - Thom Shanker, New York Times, and Major General Mark Hertling, U.S. Army.

In the information age, the first casualty of war is often trust—between those who fight the wars and those who report them. A general and a journalist express their ideas about truth, trust, and getting the story straight.

Fostering a Culture of Engagement - Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Stroud, U.S. Army, and Mr. Anton Menning.

In the contemporary media environment, the Army must move beyond “business as usual” to embrace a culture of engagement. This dynamic mediascape can be potentially chaotic, but it also offers opportunities.

Much more in the September - October 2009 edition of Military Review.

More information at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/the-militarymedia-relationship/

NYT Article: Blogging in the Military

2009-09-10T07:00:00.010-05:00

Below is a great article on our military and blogging. Jim Dao points out that we can't seem to get on the same page when operating in the information domain. Some leaders are for blogging and social media outlets while some are against it. As leaders in the Army we tend to get very anxious about those things we cannot control. We immediately put tight control measures on it until we can figure out how to apply appropriate risk mitigation measures to it. Our intentions are in the right place and the protection of our Soldiers and their families is what we believe is at risk.

I found it interesting that in the article Jim notes, "Noah Shachtman, editor of Wired.com’s national security blog, Danger Room, which has reported extensively on the new policy review, said he recently asked students at West Point whether they would allow soldiers to blog. Almost every cadet said no. " Is the right message being taught to our future leaders? Are they feeling the pressures of a "zero defect" area? Are they receiving the same message that we are at the Command and General Staff College that our Chief of Staff has put out on embracing a Culture of Engagement?

I have to agree with "Mud Puppy" (from the article) “I think that people need to hear from us, more than they need to hear from the big whigs. War has a cost, and that cost is paid by soldiers.” As leaders we should embrace this new operating terrain and learn to work inside it instead of avoiding it because it will not go away.

All that being said our guidance to our Soldiers should be; We are professionals all the time. We must ensure that our actions are in line with the Army Values and rules we volunteered to live by. If in fact we step outside those boundaries then we should ready to accept the consequences. If you engage any media outlet and are a member of the Armed Forces you should always be able to put your name next to what you say because you are a professional. We then must be ready as leaders to underwrite their mistakes because they occur.

Thoughts?

MAJ Phil Kiniery

IN, US Army

CGSC SG19A

Pentagon Keeps Wary Watch as Troops Blog

New York Times

By JAMES DAO
Published: September 8, 2009

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/us/09milblogs.html?_r=1&adxnnlx=1252584080-vptPSyOQ4tllOV5Lhq5UbQ&pagewanted=all

Over the course of 10 months in eastern Afghanistan, an Army specialist nicknamed Mud Puppy maintained a blog irreverently chronicling life at the front, from the terror of roadside bombs to the tyrannies of master sergeants.

Often funny and always profane, the blog, Embrace the Suck (military slang for making the best of a bad situation), flies under the Army’s radar. Not officially approved, it is hidden behind a password-protected wall because the reservist does not want his superiors censoring it.
“Some officer would be reviewing all my writing,” the 31-year-old soldier, who insisted that his name not be used, said in an e-mail message. “And sooner or later he would find something to nail me with.”

There are two sides to the military’s foray into the freewheeling world of the interactive Web. At the highest echelons of the Pentagon, civilian officials and four-star generals are newly hailing the power of social networking to make members of the American military more empathetic, entice recruits and shape public opinion on the war.
Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of American forces in Iraq, is on Facebook. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, has a YouTube channel and posts Twitter updates almost daily.

The Army is encouraging personnel of all ranks to go online and collaboratively rewrite seven of its field manuals. And on Aug. 17, the Department of Defense unveiled a Web site promoting links to its blogs and its Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube sites.
The Web, however, is a big place. And the many thousands of troops who use blogs, Facebook, Twitter and other social media sites to communicate with the outside world are not always in tune with the Pentagon’s official voice. Policing their daily flood of posts, videos and photographs is virtually impossible — but that has not stopped some in the military from trying.
The Department of Defense, citing growing concerns about cybersecurity, plans to issue a new policy in the coming weeks that is widely expected to set departmentwide restrictions on access to social networking sites from military computers. People involved with the department’s review say the new policy may limit access to social media sites to those who can demonstrate a clear work need, like public information officers or family counselors.

If that is the case, many officials say, it will significantly set back efforts to expand and modernize the military’s use of the Web just as those efforts are gaining momentum. And while the new policy would not apply to troops who use private Internet providers, a large number of military personnel on bases and ships across the world depend on their work computers to gain access to the Internet.

To many analysts and officers, the debate reflects a broader clash of cultures: between the anarchic, unfiltered, bottom-up nature of the Web and the hierarchical, tightly controlled, top-down tradition of the military.

“We as an institution still haven’t come to grips with how we want to use blogging” and other social media, said Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the commander of the Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

One of the Army’s leading advocates for more open access to the Web, General Caldwell argues that social networking allows interaction among enlisted soldiers, junior officers and generals in a way that was unthinkable a decade ago.

He requires students at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth to blog, and the college now sponsors 40 publicly available blogs, including his own, where policies are freely debated.

But getting approval for those blogs, as well as for YouTube and Facebook access at the college, was a struggle. “At every corner, someone cited a regulation,” General Caldwell said. In recent months, however, “the Army has made quantum leaps” in embracing the Web, he added.

Noah Shachtman, editor of Wired.com’s national security blog, Danger Room, which has reported extensively on the new policy review, said he recently asked students at West Point whether they would allow soldiers to blog. Almost every cadet said no.

“Then I asked, ‘How many of you think you can stop the flow of information from your soldiers?’ ” Mr. Shachtman recalled. “Everybody agreed there is no way to stop this information from going out anyway. So there is this sort of dual-headedness.”

Skeptics of the Pentagon review say it is motivated partly by a desire among certain officials to exert control over the voices of troops on the Web.

Since the advent of military blogging during the Iraq war, some commanders have remained uncomfortable with the art form, citing concerns about both security and decorum.
Over the years, blogs have been censored or shut down, and several years ago the Army instituted requirements that bloggers register with their commanding officers and submit posts for review. As a result, some bloggers say, blogs have become tamer — or, as in the case of Mud Puppy’s blog, gone underground.

Officials knowledgeable about the review say it is a result of growing concerns at the United States Strategic Command, which oversees the military’s use of the Internet, that social networking sites make military computers vulnerable to viruses, hackers, identity thieves, terrorists and even hostile governments. (Those concerns are not focused on the military’s secure system for classified material, which does not use the public Internet.)

The review may already be having a chilling effect. The Marine Corps recently restated a ban on using any social media on its network. And the Army, which in June gave some bases access to Facebook, Twitter and other networking sites, recently urged units to avoid creating new social media pages until the final department policy was issued.

Still, even as they consider restricting the troops’ access to social media, the most senior Pentagon officials have clearly come to view Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and blogging as crucial elements of their public information operations.

“This department, I think, is way behind our curve” in using social media, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said in July as he extolled the use of Twitter by Iranian dissidents.

To critics, the Pentagon’s social media sites are goofy at best, propagandistic at worst. “It’s like your parents’ using modern slang and failing miserably,” said Sgt. Selena Coppa, who writes a blog, Active Duty Patriot, which frequently criticizes the Iraq war and, she says, has gotten her into trouble with her superiors.

But to many troops, the deeper question is whether the military will allow personnel in the field to use the sites the Pentagon itself wants to exploit. For a generation raised on the Web, any restrictions will damage morale, those people say.

“What comes out of my blog is the experiences of a soldier right in the middle of all of this,” Mud Puppy (a nickname for military police), who recently returned home to Illinois, wrote in a recent e-mail message. “I think that people need to hear from us, more than they need to hear from the big whigs. War has a cost, and that cost is paid by soldiers.”

In Remembrance of SFC Jared Monti

2009-09-02T20:53:00.006-05:00

SFC Jared Monti will be award the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry on the 17th of September.

"Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jared C. Monti, a Military Occupational Specialty 13F Fire Support Specialist, was a Targeting NCO assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. He distinguished himself by acts of conspicuous gallantry above and beyond the call of duty against an armed enemy in Gowardesh, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. On 21 June 2006, SFC Monti, then a staff sergeant, was the assistant patrol leader for a 16-man patrol tasked to conduct surveillance in the Gowardesh region. The patrol was to provide up-to-date intelligence, interdict enemy movement and ensure early warning for the squadron’s main effort as it inserted into the province. As nightfall approached, the patrol was attacked by a well organized enemy force of at least 60 personnel. Outnumbered four-to-one, SFC Monti’s patrol was in serious danger of being overrun. The enemy fighters had established two support-by-fire positions directly above the patrol in a densely wooded ridgeline. SFC Monti immediately returned fire and ordered the patrol to seek cover and return fire. He then reached for his radio headset and calmly initiated calls for indirect fire and close air support (CAS), both danger-close to the patrol’s position. He did this while simultaneously directing the patrol’s fires. When SFC Monti realized that a member of the patrol, Private First Class (PFC) Brian J. Bradbury, was critically wounded and exposed 10 meters from cover, without regard for his personal safety, he advanced through enemy fire to within three feet of PFC Bradbury’s position. But he was forced back by intense RPG fire. He tried again to secure PFC Bradbury, but he was forced to stay in place again as the enemy intensified its fires. The remaining patrol members coordinated covering fires for SFC Monti, and he advanced a third time toward the wounded Soldier. But he only took a few steps this time before he was mortally wounded by an RPG. About the same time, the indirect fires and CAS he called for began raining down on the enemy’s position. The firepower broke the enemy attack, killing 22 enemy fighters. SFC Monti’s actions prevented the patrol’s position from being overrun, saved his team’s lives and inspired his men to fight on against overwhelming odds. SFC Monti epitomizes what it means to be an NCO. Because of his personal sacrifice and selfless service to the Army, the men of his patrol are alive today and continue the fight." --Taken from FIRES Bulletin. United States Army. March–April 2009--

"SFC Jared C. Monti—A Redleg Hero". FIRES Bulletin. United States Army. March–April 2009. http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2009/Mar_Apr_2009/MAR_APR_2009_Page3.pdf. Retrieved 2009-09-02-23.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

On September 17, President Barack Obama will award Staff Sergeant Jared C. Monti, U.S. Army, the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry. Staff Sergeant Monti will receive the Medal of Honor posthumously for his heroic actions in combat in Afghanistan. He displayed immeasurable courage and uncommon valor - eventually sacrificing his own life in an effort to save his comrade. Staff Seargent Monti’s parents, Paul Monti and Janet Monti will join the President at the White House to commemorate their son’s example of selfless service and sacrifice.

PERSONAL BACKGROUND:
Jared C. Monti was born on September 20, 1975. He was a native of Raynham, Massachusetts. He graduated from Bridgewater-Raynham High School. He enlisted in the United States Army in March 1993. He attended Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

His military decorations include: the Bronze Star, Purple Heart, five Army Commendation Medals, four Army Achievement Medals, three Good Conduct Medals, three National Defense Service Medals, to name a few.

He is survived by his Father, Paul Monti, his Mother, Janet Monti, his Sister Niccole Monti, his Brother, Timothy Monti, and his Niece, Carys Monti.

He was posthumously promoted to Sergeant First Class.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-To-Award-Medal-of-Honor/

Admiral Mullen's Strategic Communications Article

2009-09-01T19:05:00.007-05:00

Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed strategic communications in a recent article that was published in the Joint Forces Quarterly. "From the Chairman, Strategic Communications: Getting Back to Basics." http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/edition/i55/1.pdf

The Chairman talks about several points on Strategic Communications in his article. I believe there are two points that are being applied at the Command and General Staff College, (CGSC) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Admiral Mullen states, "we have allowed strategic communications to become a thing instead of a process..." At a microlevel, the Command and General Staff College requires students to engage in four different types of outreach engagements. These "practicle exercises" allow field grade officers to understand the powerful impacts these engagements can have before going back to the deploying force. It is essential in today's information domain to consider incorporating strategic communications as part of our planning processes. Engaging with the public, in any domain, as a military should be considered an operation and treated as such, deliberate planning with a clear endstate.

Admiral Mullen also states, "... But more important than any particular tool, we must know the context within which our actions will be received and understood. We hurt ourselves and the message we try to send when it appears we are doing something merely for the credit." The Chairman's point is clearly to back our message up with our actions; but I believe he also brings up another point, it should never be about "I". As we work to fullfill the requirements here at CGSC, we are focused on making it about those we serve. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines represent half of one percent of the U.S. population. Their stories are the ones that need to be shared. The American public should know the sacrifices that these heroes and their family members are making for our nation each and everyday.

Our Army is providing an opportunity in a learning environment to become more active in a Culture of Engagement. We definitely don't have it completely right and we are not the best at it, but our Army is taking the right steps toward training and educating Leaders so that we embrace it.

MAJ Phil Kiniery
IN, US Army
CGSC SG19A
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

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Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge U.S. Afghan Force

On General Krulak's E-mail to George Will

Posted by Paul Yingling on September 11, 2009 4:43 AMFrom Small Wars Journal

The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage?

NYT Article: Blogging in the Military

In Remembrance of SFC Jared Monti

Admiral Mullen's Strategic Communications Article

Posted by Paul Yingling on September 11, 2009 4:43 AM
From Small Wars Journal